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I. INTRODUCTION

Six days after terrorist attacks shook New York City and
Washington, D.C., the FBI raided an apartment complex in a suburb
of Detroit and apprehended three North African men.1 Among the
men's possessions were hand-drawn sketches potentially detailing
targets for terrorist attacks abroad. Four men 2 were charged with
providing material support for terrorism and document fraud and
were brought to trial two years later. 3 Richard Convertino, an
assistant United States attorney with a strong track record in the
DOJ, was tapped to prosecute the case and won convictions against
three of the four defendants. 4 Attorney General John Ashcroft
personally and publicly lauded the importance of the case and
6
proclaimed the convictions victories in the war on terror.
Allegations soon arose, however, that Convertino and a
''regional security officer" concealed photographs of one of the alleged
targets from the defense at trial. 6 The defense claimed that these
photographs would have shown that the sketches were benign and not
7
"terrorist casing sketches" as the prosecution had asserted at trial.
Convertino vigorously denied any wrongdoing, but an investigation
revealed that he may have received an email containing the
1.
This case is the recent prosecution of former Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard
Convertino stemming from his role as lead prosecutor in United States v. Koubriti. Danny
Hakim, Trial Set to Begin for Four Men Accused of Being in Terror Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2003, at A14. Convertino emphatically proclaimed his innocence, with those defending him
calling the prosecution an act of political revenge for Convertino's criticism of the current
administration and Department of Justice. See generally http://www.convertino.org (last visited
Oct. 5, 2008) (chronicling Convertino's "fight against malicious prosecution and abuse of
governmental power").
2.
A fourth suspect and defendant, an Alergian, had previously been arrested.
3.
United States v. Koubriti, Second Superseding Indictment, No. 01-80778 (E.D. Mich.
2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/
uskoubriti82802ind.pdf.
4.
Danny Hakim & Caitlin Nish, 2 Arabs Convicted and 2 Cleared Of Terrorist Plot
Against the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2003, at Al. Two of the four were convicted on "terror"
related charges, while a third was convicted of a charge related to document fraud. Id. The fourth
defendant was acquitted on all charges. Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Philip Shenon, Ex-ProsecutorAcquitted of Misconduct in 9/11 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2007, at A18.
7.
Id.
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photographs at issue. Amid a maelstrom of controversy and
allegations of political reprisal, Convertino was charged and indicted
for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and making false declarations.8
This may have been the first time a U.S. attorney faced prosecution
for failing to adhere to his prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence. That distinction was of little solace to Convertino as he
awaited his fate at trial, facing the very real possibility of years
behind bars. 9
At almost the same time in Durham, North Carolina, an exotic
dancer accused three athletes at Duke University of raping her at an
off-campus party where she had been hired to perform. 10 The county's
district attorney, Mike Nifong-facing reelection 1 ' and a volatile
electorate-immediately took the reigns of the case, speaking to the
2
media freely and exalting the strength of the impending prosecution.'
As the prosecution moved forward, it became apparent that the
evidence in the case was less than convincing. Nifong subsequently
withheld the results of a DNA test, witness statements, and other
13
evidence that cast significant doubt on the guilt of the three accused.
Against an onslaught of criticism, Nifong remained recalcitrant,
refusing to abandon the prosecution, and instead asked the state
attorney general's office to take control of the case. 14 The North
Carolina Attorney General soon dismissed all charges against the
students, proclaimed their innocence, and cited numerous
5
prosecutorial improprieties.
8.
United States v. Convertino, Indictment, No. 06-20173 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Convertino
and Smith were acquitted of all charges on Oct. 31, 2007.
9.
Shenon, supra note 6.
10. This case is the recent highly publicized "Duke Lacrosse Case" pursued by former
Durham Country, North Carolina District Attorney Michael Nifong. For background
information, see generally Duke Office of News & Commc'n, Looking Back at the Duke Lacrosse
Case, http://news.duke.edu/lacrosseincident/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
11. Benjamin Niolet, Michael Biesecker & Anne Blythe, Nifong Prevails in DA Race, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 3, 2006, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/630/story/
435392.html.
12. ProsecutorialIndiscretion,WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2006, at B6.
13. Lara Setrakian & Chris Francescani, FormerDuke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred
Durham DA Mike Nifong Indicates He Will Not Appeal, ABC NEWS, June 16, 2007, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3285862&page=1.
14. Joseph Neff & Anne Blythe, Nifong Asks to Be Removed from Case, NEWS AND
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 12, 2007, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/1185/story/
531708.html.
15. Aaron Beard, Prosecutors Drop Charges in Duke Case, ABC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2007,
available at http:/labcnews.go.comfUSlwireStory?id=3029763. For an in-depth analysis of
discovery in the Duke Lacrosse case, see Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and
The Road to the Disbarmentof Mike Nifong: The CriticalImportance of Full Open-File Discovery,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008).
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Admittedly, prosecutorial behavior in these two cases was
extreme, but each example gives rise to significant questions about
our system of criminal justice. When a prosecutor misbehaves, what
outcome is just? Should a factually guilty defendant escape
punishment because of a prosecutor's error? Who really suffers in
these situations? How should prosecutors pay for their misdeeds?
Convertino endured a full-blown jury trial and could have spent years
behind bars if convicted, while Nifong lost his license to practice law
and spent just one night in jail. 16 Which outcome is fair?
The two cases also illustrate that prosecutors can wield an
incredible amount of control over the civil liberties of their fellow
citizens by withholding evidence. When abuses of this nature occur,
repercussions are few and inconsistent. This Note examines the
federal and state remedies currently employed to combat prosecutorial
failure to disclose evidence. An examination of these remedies reveals
a frustrating system; disclosure violations continue to occur at high
rates at both the federal and state levels, 17 while individual
prosecutors rarely face repercussions for these violations. This Note
makes two primary recommendations for decreasing the incidence of
disclosure violations. First, "open-file" policies during the pretrial
period are essential to combat failures to disclose. Second, post-trial
criminal prosecutions should be used more frequently against
offending prosecutors. Admittedly, the second proposal is dramatic,
but if the epidemic of disclosure violations is as rampant and
longstanding as it seems, a dramatic cure may be exactly what is
needed.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1963, the Supreme Court handed down its seminal decision
in Brady v. Maryland. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the
prosecution in a criminal trial to disclose all evidence that is favorable
to the accused and "material to guilt or to punishment."' 8 Forty-five
years after Brady, prosecutors' so-called "Brady obligations" remain
unclear, despite the Court's subsequent elaboration. The convoluted
16. Nifong also endured a number of other repercussions.
17. See ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE 130-32 (2007) (noting that "Brady violations are
among the most common forms of prosecutorial misconduct" and discussing a study by the
Chicago Tribune which revealed that among cases studied between 1963 and 1999, 381
defendants were convicted, and sixty-seven of them sentenced to death, because prosecutors
either concealed exculpatory information or presented false evidence).

18. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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history of judicial and legislative measures that follows in this Section
demonstrates that today's prosecutorial system still fails to meet the
constitutional due process requirement enunciated in Brady.
A. Due Process and the Disclosure of Evidence
1. Brady v. Maryland
John L. Brady was convicted of first-degree murder for his role
in a killing during a robbery and was sentenced to death. 19 Brady
appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution had kept the
confession of his accomplice from him.2 0 The Court held that the
failure to disclose this statement violated Brady's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and announced that "the
suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." 21 Brady adheres to the belief that "[s]ociety wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair;
our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly." 22 The decision echoes the idea that, in this country,
a prosecutor's ultimate duty is "not to convict, but to see that justice is
done."

23

Brady was an extension of the Court's prior due process
jurisprudence. In Mooney v. Holohan, a 1935 opinion, the Court
invalidated a verdict obtained through the knowing submission of
perjured testimony to a jury. 24 In doing so, the Court held that "[s]uch
a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of
a defendant is an [sic] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." 25 The
Court's 1942 decision in Pyle v. Kansas held that deliberate
suppression of favorable evidence and utilization of perjured
testimony violates due process in a "deprivation of rights guaranteed
26
by the Federal Constitution.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 84-86.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id.

23.

ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908).

24.
25.
26.

294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Id. at 112.
317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
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In the forty-four years since Brady, some critics have argued
that those accused of crimes in the United States are not receiving the
due process that Brady supposedly assures. Some suggest that Brady
failed from its inception "as a discovery doctrine" because it "is
insufficiently enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually
unenforceable when violations are hidden." 27 Regardless of the reason
for Brady's failure, nondisclosure of favorable evidence continues to
occur far too often.
2. Developments After Brady
a. What Is "Material?"
The Supreme Court has continued to refine the scope of
prosecutors' disclosure duties since Brady. In doing so, the largest
problem for the Court has been defining a standard of "materiality."
The Court's materiality requirement is necessary; otherwise, a failure
to turn over any tangential or irrelevant piece of evidence could render
the trial court's verdict invalid. 28 Such a requirement would place an
enormous burden on the prosecutor while only minimally benefiting
the defendant, and the Brady Court determined that due process does
not demand so much. 29 A "true" Brady violation demands that "[t]he
evidence at issue [ ] be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued." 30 As the doctrine developed, however,
the threshold requirement of actual prejudice proved to be
problematic.
In United States v. Agurs, 31 the Court named three different
contexts in which Brady obligations apply: (1) cases like Mooney, in
which perjured testimony is employed and prosecutors know or should
know of such perjury; (2) cases like Brady, in which the defense makes
a specific pretrial request for evidence; and (3) cases in which the
defense either makes a broad request for exculpatory evidence or no
request at all. 32 The Agurs Court found that evidence in the first

27. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685,
687 (2006).
28. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
29. Id.
30. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
31. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
32. Id. at 103-06.
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scenario was material because "a conviction obtained by the knowing
use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and [the evidence
is material] if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury."33 In the
second scenario, the Court suggested that evidence capable of
"affecting the outcome" of the trial is material and must be disclosed.3 4
In the third scenario, the Court noted that omitting evidence that
"creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist" is a
35
constitutional error.
Agurs noted that "[t]he test of materiality in a case like Brady
in which specific information has been requested by the defense is not
necessarily the same as in a case in which no such request has been
made." 36 Later, however, the Court in United States v. Bagley
abrogated this distinction and held that the test for materiality is the
same whether the defense makes no request, a general request, or a
specific request.3 7 The test in all circumstances is whether "there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 38 The
Bagley Court, in part relying on Strickland v. Washington, defined
"reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine
39
confidence in the outcome."
The Court further clarified the standard of materiality in Kyles
v. Whitley and held that "[t]he question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." 40 In
addition, the Court set forth four principles that further define
Bagley's "reasonable probability" standard: (1) materiality does not
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id. at 106 (discussing Brady and noting that the "confession could not have affected the
outcome on the issue of guilt but could have affected Brady's punishment. It was material on the
latter issue but not the former. And since it was not material on the issue of guilt, the entire trial
was not lacking in due process."). Justice Stevens did not specifically articulate a standard for
materiality, but "affected the outcome" seems to be the standard that the Court intended. See
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681 (finding the "standard of materiality applicable in the
absence of a specific Brady request is therefore stricter than the harmless-error standard but
more lenient to the defense than the newly-discovered-evidence standard").
35. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
36. Id.
37. 473 U.S. at 682.
38. Id.
39. Id. However, it should be emphasized that in the Strickland context (dealing with
ineffective assistance of counsel claims) courts seem to focus on confidence in the overall
adversarial process and its truth-seeking function rather than the ultimate verdict rendered.
40. 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
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mandate that the defendant show beyond a preponderance of the
evidence that disclosure would have resulted in acquittal; (2) a
defendant need not show that the evidence was insufficient to convict
"after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed
evidence;" (3) once an appellate court has applied Bagley and found a
constitutional error, harmless-error review need not follow; and (4)
materiality should be judged with an emphasis on the "cumulative
41
effect of suppression" and not through piecemeal analysis.
Problematically, the same standard of materiality has been
employed before trial by prosecutors and post trial by judges because,
"unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was
no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and
absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the
prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose." 42 While a materiality
analysis seems practicable post hoc, it remains difficult for prosecutors
43
to use the standard uniformly to guide their pretrial decisions.
Prosecutors are forced to make independent predictions about whether
there is a reasonable probability that the outcomes of their cases
would be different if they withheld evidence. 44 Such a determination
obviously is easier to make after events have played out at trial. Thus,
in practice there is a notable disparity between the post-trial decision
of a judge and the pretrial evaluation of a prosecutor. Since the
standard is "inevitably imprecise," and because it is difficult to
analyze the importance of a single piece of evidence in isolation,
45
ideally a prosecutor would tend to err on the side of disclosure.
Despite the other requirements of Brady, the subjective intent
of the prosecutor does not matter because the obligation to disclose

41. Id. at 434-38.
42. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976).
43. See Christopher Deal, Note, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty To
Disclose and the Right To a Trial By Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1780 (2007) (arguing that "it
is both impractical and unconstitutional to ask prosecutors to use materiality as the measure of
their disclosure obligations before trial," and advocating a new balancing test weighing the
"Brady disclosure rules and the defendant's right to a trial by jury to determine when favorable
evidence must be disclosed"); see also Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old
Objections Must Yield To New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 563-69 (2006) (arguing that
"[r]ather than encouraging prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure, as the Court suggested
would happen, the materiality standard that has evolved since Brady provides the opposite
incentive," and thus "the Supreme Court has defined a standard for disclosure that has not lived
up to Brady's ideal that '[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair' ").

44. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
45. See id. at 439 (stating that "a prosecutor anxious about [not disclosing material
evidence] will disclose a favorable piece of evidence").
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applies regardless of the prosecutor's good (or bad) faith. 46 The harm
to a defendant in instances of nondisclosure is not alleviated merely
because a prosecutor made a good-faith error in judgment or was
simply negligent in meeting the Brady requirements. Moreover,
"reliance on prosecutorial intent would create an unduly narrow rule
that could make judicial ascertainment of the government's motives
paramount to an assessment of the fairness of the trial," thereby
undercutting the original impetus underlying Brady.47 Although the
subjective intent of the prosecutor is not relevant to determining
whether a violation has occurred, it is extremely instructive in
determining how to deal with prosecutors who fail to disclose
48
exculpatory evidence.
3. Practical Application of Brady Obligations
Although Brady and its progeny provide prosecutors with
amorphous guidance, the Court has offered some practical guidance
over the years. The Court noted that "[t]here is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not
create one." 49 Nonetheless, a prosecutor is obligated to be aware of
favorable evidence known to other prosecutors and investigative
50
agencies acting on the prosecution's behalf, including police agencies.
Furthermore, the Court determined that evidence that would impeach
51
the credibility of a witness must be turned over to the defense.
Still, there is "no constitutional requirement that the
prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of
all police investigatory work on a case," 52 and the Constitution does
not require the prosecution to supply the defendant with the names of

46. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 8'3, 87
(1963); see also Susan S. Kuo and C.W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois
Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695, 700-01 (2007) (additionally noting that circuit courts have
not differentiated between "negligent and willful nondisclosures" in determining if due process
has been violated).
47. Peter J. Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct and ConstitutionalRemedies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 713, 761 (noting that "Brady cited Mooney and its progeny to reach a result that
fundamentally changed the due process analysis of prosecutorial misconduct, eschewing an
assessment of prosecutorial intent for a broader review of the overall fairness of the proceeding").
48. See supra notes 46-47 (discussing relevance of subjective intent when punishing
prosecutors).
49. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
50. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
51. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54 ("When the 'reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within
[the Brady rule]." (citation omitted)).
52. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972).
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unfavorable prosecution witnesses before trial.53 Also, if information is
largely cumulative of previously disclosed information or if the
accused had knowledge of the information or the ability to acquire
such information with reasonable diligence, the evidence is not
54
material for Brady purposes.
All of these rules are built on the idea that "[t]he mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." 55 In fact, the Court
consistently has maintained that the mandates of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses do not require
prosecutors to reveal to the defendant every piece of evidence or even
56
every piece of favorable evidence in their possession, without more.
With each decision the Supreme Court has pushed itself further along,
but not off of, this tightrope between a prosecutor's ability to act
effectively as the state's advocate and the prosecutor's overarching
duty to see that justice is done.
B. Statutory and Other Guidance
Brady and its progeny lay out a persistently perplexing
constitutional framework of the prosecutorial duty to disclose. As a
result, the way that this framework has been put into practice on both
the federal and state levels has been anything but uniform. Rules of
criminal procedure and legislation attempt to clarify and elaborate on
the prosecutorial duty to disclose favorable evidence, but
unfortunately they do so with limited success.
1. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
While there is no constitutional guarantee of discovery in
criminal cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 ("Rule 16")
attempts to ensure that a qualified flow of information exists between
the prosecution and the defense in federal cases. 57 In 1974, the
53. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559 ("It does not follow from the prohibition against
concealing evidence favorable to the accused that the prosecution must reveal before trial the
names of all witnesses who will testify unfavorably.").
54. Kuo & Taylor, supra note 46, at 702 (citing Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 518-19 (6th
Cir. 2000); Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Avellino, 136
F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998); Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1996)).
55. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).
56. See supranotes 49-55 and accompanying text (citing cases supporting this proposition).
57. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment (explaining that
the Rule "is revised to give greater discovery to both the prosecution and the defense").
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Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
explained that it opted "not to codify the Brady Rule" in order to give
broader discovery to both parties in a federal case. 58 Accordingly, Rule
16 requires prosecutors to disclose certain evidence to the defense.
This includes the substance of any oral statement made by the
defendant to the government that the government intends to use at
trial. Further, a defendant's written or recorded statements within the
government's possession that the prosecutor knows (or should know)
exist must be turned over. 59 The government is also under a
continuing obligation to disclose information as it becomes available
prior to or during trial. 60 In the event of noncompliance by a party,
Rule 16 permits courts to order that party to allow discovery or
inspection, to grant a continuance, to prevent the party from
introducing the undisclosed evidence, or to enter orders that are "just
61
under the circumstances."
Rule 16 essentially imposes a reciprocal obligation for the
defense to turn over the same material it wishes to acquire from the
government pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(E)-(G). 62 The defense, however,
is under no obligation to turn over documents made by the defendant,
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant's agent during the
investigation or defense of the case. 63 The defense is not required to
disclose statements made to the defendant, the defendant's attorney,
or the defendant's agent by the defendant, a government or defense
64
witness, or a prospective government or defense witness.
Rule 16 has been a point of contention between the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and groups such as the American
College of Trial Lawyers ("ACTL"). The ACTL favors an amendment to
the rules that codifies Brady, clarifies "both the nature and scope of
favorable information," and implements a due diligence requirement

58. Id.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(B). Further, the government must: (1) provide a copy of
the defendant's prior criminal record; (2) turn over documents and objects in the government's
possession that are "material to preparing the defense," are intended for use by the government
as evidence in chief at the trial, or were "obtained from or belongf to the defendant;" and (3)
allow the defense to inspect examinations and tests that are material to the preparation of the

defense. Lastly, the government must turn over any written summaries of expert testimony that
it intends to use at trial. Id. 16(a)(1)(D)-(G).
60. Id. 16(c)(1)-(2).
61. Id. 16(d)(2)(A)-(D).
62. Id. 16(b)(1)(A)-(C).
63. Id. 16(b)(2)(A)-(B).
64.

Id.
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for prosecutors in locating information. 65 In response, the DOJ
contends that Brady obligations already are sufficiently " 'defined by
existing law that is the product of more than four decades of
experience with the Brady rule,' and therefore no codification of the
Brady rule [is] warranted."66 In 2004, the Advisory Committee
forwarded a new draft of Rule 16 to the Standing Committee for
publication that would have added the following subsection:
(H) Exculpatory or Impeaching Information. Upon a defendant's request, the
government must make available all information that is known to the attorney for the
government or agents of law enforcement involved in the investigation of the case that is
either exculpatory or impeaching. The court 67may not order disclosure of impeachment
information earlier than 14 days before trial.

Ultimately, however, the Standing Committee rejected the proposal,
68
preserving the language of Rule 16 as is.
The Advisory Committee's notes to the proposed amendment
stated that the amendment was "intended to supplement the
prosecutor's obligations to disclose material exculpatory or impeaching
information under Brady v. Maryland. . . . The rule contains no
requirement that the information be 'material' to guilt. '69 Also, the
proposed amendment would require prosecutors to disclose to the
defense all exculpatory or impeaching information known to any law
enforcement agency that participated in the case "without further
speculation as to whether this information will ultimately be material
to guilt. '70 The amendment would have acted as a catch-all of sorts,
codifying most of the key elements of the Court's Brady jurisprudence
while eliminating the need for a showing of materiality as to guilt or
innocence.
Such an amendment likely will continue to spark debate in the
Rules Committee in the future, but for now, the Rule 16 disclosure
requirements remain the same. Although the amendment would have

65. LAURAL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, ORDERS AND POLICIES 6 (2007) (quoting

Memorandum from Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers to the Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 2 (Oct. 2003)), available at http://www.fic.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookuplbradyma2.pdf/$file/bradyma2.pdf.
66. Id. (citing Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice (Criminal Div.) to Hon. Susan C.
Bucklew, Chair, Judicial Conference Subcomm. on Rules 11 and 16, at 2 (Apr. 26, 2004)).
67. Id. at 7, 23-24.
68. See Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Minutes of Oct. 1-2, 2007,
at 5, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules[Minutes/CR1O-2007-min.pdf.
69. HOOPER & THORPE, supranote 65, at 23-24.
70. Id.
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provided uniformity that is long overdue, 71 it certainly was not a cureall for Brady violations. The drive to amend Rule 16 demonstrates
that Brady violations remain very relevant and, regrettably, are
unaddressed by the current procedural scheme.
2. The Jencks Act
The Jencks Act ("the Act") regulates discovery of statements
made by witnesses appearing for the government in federal criminal
trials. 72 Under the Act, the defense may by motion compel the
production of any statement by a witness testifying for the state that
"relates to the subject matter" of the witness's testimony. 73 The Act
has been criticized, however, because it only allows such a motion
after the witness has testified at trial.74 The purported rationale for
this delay is to protect witnesses from threats to their safety and to
prevent the defense witnesses from changing their testimony to

71. See infra Section II.B.iii (describing the lack of uniformity among federal district
courts).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). The Act provides, in part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a
Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the
defendant) shall be the subject of subpena, discovery, or inspection until said
witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the
possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to
which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall
order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
But see United States v. Avellino, 129 F. Supp. 2d 214, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that "the
government's Brady obligation trumps the statutory time table set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3500,"
meaning the government cannot wait until after a witness has testified on direct examination to
disclose "material evidence favorable to the defendant").
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2000).
74. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckermann, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on
Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1090
(1991). Sarokin and Zuckermann argue:
[S]trict compliance with the Jencks Act necessitates frequent delays and
adjournments. Counsel often need time to digest and investigate the
information received. As a practical matter, any thorough investigation at
that juncture of the proceedings may be impossible, and counsel must do the
best that they can in the brief time usually allotted. The court and the jury
are inconvenienced by even brief delays ....
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"accommodate information received from the government." 75 As will be
discussed in Part IV, some critics do not believe that concern for the
safety of witnesses is enough to justify the current strictures.
The Jencks Act and Brady conflict when the defense seeks
potentially exculpatory statements made by witnesses before they
testify at trial. Federal courts are split on how to resolve this
tension. 76 Some courts conclude that providing such statements after a
witness testifies at trial is insufficient, and therefore a prosecutor's
obligation to disclose "trumps" the Jencks Act. 77 Others see no conflict,
maintaining that, as long as the material is provided at trial, no
78
Brady problem exists.
3. District Court Rules
Brady obligations are not uniformly incorporated into the local
rules of district courts. 79 Thirty-seven of the ninety-four districts have
a local rule, order, or procedure that specifically governs Brady
obligations.8 0 The remaining fifty-seven districts have not employed
any rules to help prosecutors execute their Brady obligations, and
instead follow Rule 16 or a local rule analog.81 Among the thirty-seven
districts that do have a Brady regulation, twenty-eight require
automatic disclosure, nine require disclosure only upon the request of
the defense, two employ a rebuttable presumption that the defendant
automatically requests disclosure, and one mandates a pretrial
conference to determine what must be disclosed under Brady.8 2 Also,
in most (thirty-one of the thirty-seven) of these districts, the disclosure
obligation persists beyond the initial discovery and continues
throughout the trial, similar to Rule 16(c).8 3 No local rule, order, or
procedure employed at the district court level provides a remedy or

75. NI. at 1089.
76. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE pt. IV, ch. 20, § 3 (3d ed. 2007)
(noting that "Federal courts have divided treating such potential conflicts between Brady and
the limits placed on federal pretrial discovery").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 65, at 7-8 (summarizing differences in incorporation
of Brady obligations by district courts).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
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sanction for nondisclosure, however.8 4 Instead, most jurisdictions rely
on the court's general sanctioning power as authorized by Rule 16.85
4. State Rules
All fifty states have adopted some sort of disclosure rule, often
enacting a rule of procedure similar to Rule 16.86 Some states exceed
the scope of Rule 16 and the Brady constitutional obligations,
however, by explicitly setting deadlines by which prosecutors must
have disclosed evidence.8 7 Most states also employ a continuing duty
of disclosure after the initial discovery period.8 8 Every state has some
type of sanction for prosecutors who fail to comply with disclosure
requirements; several states enable their trial courts to dismiss the
charges completely while other states have found dismissal to be too
severe. 8 9 Overall, as it is on the federal level, protection from
prosecutorial failure to disclose is inconsistent at the state level,
exposing defendants in different jurisdictions to potentially great
discrepancies in legal process.
III. ANALYSIS
Against this backdrop of constitutional, statutory, and
procedural obligations of disclosure, a number of remedies have been
suggested to prevent breaches of these obligations. Professional
disciplinary actions, judicial remedies, internal supervision, and civil
liability all have been offered as means of combating Brady violations.
However, an analysis of each proffered remedy reveals that all have
been generally ineffective in combating disclosure violations.

84. Id. The authors note, however, that some districts reference negative consequences for
the prosecution in the event of a Brady violation. For instance:
The Eastern District of Michigan's rule notes "the government proceeds at its
peril if there is a failure to disclose information pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1) and
exculpatory evidence." And the Western District of Kentucky's rule states
that the "[flailure to disclose Brady [material] at a time when it can be used
effectively may result in a recess or continuance so that defendant may
properly utilize such evidence."
Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id. at 61.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. For a more in-depth discussion, see id. at 59-60.
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A. Ethical Guidance and ProfessionalDiscipline

1. ABA Guidelines
The underlying ethos of Brady is hardly a new one. It was
articulated as early as 1908 when the American Bar Association
("ABA") adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics, which state that
"the primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict, but to see that justice is done." 90 Every state has adopted
some formulation of ethical standards for attorneys in general (and
prosecutors specifically), largely based on principles first promulgated
by the ABA. 9 1 In 1980, the ABA adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility's Disciplinary Rule ("Model Code"), which
provides in pertinent part that a prosecutor must disclose the
existence of evidence known to the prosecutor or other government
lawyer that "tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment."92 A literal reading of
this section implies that a prosecutor is under the obligation to
disclose the fact that exculpatory evidence exists but not necessarily to
turn it over to the defense. 93 The ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.8(d) provides that a prosecutor in a criminal
case must disclose all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
94
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense.
Similarly, in perhaps the most comprehensive set of ethical guidelines
for prosecutorial conduct, 95 the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards
("Standards") require that a prosecutor not intentionally fail to
disclose the existence of all evidence or information that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense charged, or reduce
the punishment of the accused. 96 Further, the Standards require that
a prosecutor make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with
90. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908).
91. Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without A Remedy: The Effective Enforcement Of The Duty
Of ProsecutorsTo Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 879 (1997).
92. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1980).
93. See Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions Against ProsecutorsFor Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 711 (1987) (pointing out that because "[d]isciplinary Rule 7103(B) requires the disclosure only of 'the existence of evidence[,]' [t]his theoretically allows the
prosecutor merely to inform the defense that the evidence exists without actually turning it
over").
94.

ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004).

95. Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom
Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39,
42 (1987).
96. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Stand. 3-3.11 (2d ed. 1980).
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discovery requests and not avoid seeking evidence because it might
97
damage the prosecution's case.
Thus, the Model Rules and the Standards both incorporate a
duty to disclose evidence and information that tends to negate guilt or
mitigate an offense. 98 Even though the prosecutorial duty to disclose is
specifically listed in ethical guidelines like the Model Rules, little is
offered in the way of defining whether a piece of evidence "tends to
negate the guilt" of a defendant, again leaving the prosecutor to his
own devices when attempting to proceed ethically. 99
Under these guidelines, the prosecution's ethical duty seems to
be broader than its constitutional duty. The U.S. Constitution
requires a prosecutor merely to disclose evidence that is materially
favorable to the defense. Ethical rules such as Model Rule 3.8(d),
however, oblige a prosecutor to disclose all evidence that "tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense," which is more
accommodating
than
outcome-determinative
strictures
of
materiality. 10 0 Model Rule 3.8(d) is not limited to admissible evidence;
it includes all evidence or information that is favorable to the accused,
whether or not it is admissible. 10 1 Furthermore, a prosecutor is not
constitutionally obligated to disclose cumulative evidence, evidence of
which a defendant is already aware, or evidence the defendant can
acquire through reasonable diligence; ethical requirements do not
mandate such a restriction. 0 2 Thus, "[a]n ethical violation can, and
often will, be present even when due process is not violated." 10 3 In
theory at least, ethical guidelines create a broader obligation of
criminal discovery.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice: ProsecutorialOversight
and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 137 (2007) (noting that ethical guidelines such as
these have been criticized as offering only a "handful of special ethical obligations for
prosecutors," but not acting as "a guideline at all, and as a result, the prosecutor is thrown back
on his own subjective value and notions about fundamental fairness").
100. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 691
n.28 (2006); see also Rosen, supra note 93, at 714 (noting "[t]he ethical duties imposed by all
three of the modern codes, however, are significantly broader than the due process standard in
one important respect-the absence of a materiality requirement").
101. Gershman, supra note 100, at 691 n.28.
102. Id.

103. Rosen, supra note 93, at 714 (citing United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.
1978); United States ex rel. Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978); Ruiz v. Cady, 548 F.
Supp. 764 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Nelson v. State, 208 N.W.2d 410 (Wis. 1973)).
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2. Professional Discipline
With such a powerful arsenal of ethical guidelines, professional
discipline by bar associations should present a formidable method of
curbing prosecutorial failures to disclose. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, "a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his
peers."'10 4 As numerous commentators have decried, however, "despite
the universal adoption by the states of Disciplinary Rules prohibiting
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence ... and despite
numerous reported cases showing violations of these rules,
disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and meaningful
sanctions rarely applied."'10 5 Presented with the implicit difficulties of
charging a prosecutor with an ethical violation, professional
disciplinary bodies seem "unable or unwilling to grapple with ethical
10 6
violations by prosecutors."'
Intuitively, it seems that Brady violations should be addressed
in disciplinary proceedings, as "an appellate court will in many cases
already have reviewed the facts and made a finding of the prosecutor's
misconduct," and thus a lot of the factual legwork will already have
Empirically, however, bar
been done for bar associations. 0 7
disciplinary authorities are underutilized. 0 8 Several obstacles
104. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
105. Rosen, supra note 93, at 697; see also Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001) (noting that "[niumerous commentators have reacted by
noting the dearth of cases in which disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors").
106. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 454 (1992).
107. Weeks, supra note 91, at 880.
108. See Rosen, supra note 93, at 720 (finding, at the time of his publication, only nine
instances of discipline for Brady-like violations by prosecutors); see also Weeks, supra note 91, at
881-82 (finding an additional seven instances of disciplinary action against prosecutors for
Brady infractions since Rosen's publication, of which only four received actual punishment);
NEIL GORDON, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, MISCONDUCT AND PUNISHMENT: STATE DISCIPLINARY
available at
AUTHORITIES INVESTIGATE PROSECUTORS ACCUSED OF MISCONDUCT (2003),
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/pm/default.aspx?act=sidebarsb&aid=39:
Out of 44 attorney disciplinary cases: In 7, the court dismissed the complaint
or did not impose a punishment. In 20, the court imposed a public or private
reprimand or censure. In 12, the prosecutor's license to practice law was
suspended. In 2, the prosecutor was disbarred. In 1, a period of probation was
imposed in lieu of a harsher punishment. In 24, the prosecutor was assessed
the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. In 3, the court remanded the case
for further proceedings.
This does not mean that disciplinary actions never occur, nor does it imply that professional
disciplinary tools are always toothless when actually employed. See Zacharias, supra note 105, at
745 (finding "at least that, in appropriate cases, courts and disciplinary organizations sometimes
have been willing to address prosecutorial misconduct" and that instances of suppression of
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typically decrease the likelihood that a disciplinary body will levy
sanctions against a misbehaving prosecutor.
One preliminary obstacle is "actually getting the prosecutor
before the disciplinary body for a review of his or her actions." 10 9
Disciplinary complaints typically are initiated by individuals, and
because prosecutors, unlike private attorneys, do not have individual
clients, lodging a complaint falls to the defense attorney or the
defendant, who often are more focused on the underlying case than on
reporting the prosecutor. 110 In addition, defense attorneys frequently
must work again with the same prosecutors, and consequently are
reluctant to file a complaint against a prosecutor. ' Moreover, even
when complaints are filed, disciplinary bodies fail to impose strong
112
punishments on prosecutors.
Further compounding the problem, federal prosecutors often
refuse to comply with state disciplinary guidelines.11 3 In 1989, the
infamous "Thornburgh Memo" announced that federal prosecutors
would follow internal DOJ guidelines rather than the ethical rules of
the state in which they pursue a case.1 1 4 While the Citizens Protection
Act of 1998 officially overturned this practice, federal prosecutors
remain unwilling to follow state ethical guidelines, and the Act merely
returned prosecutors to their previous state of reluctance, which is
unproductive in deterring or punishing wrongdoing.1 15
There also are hidden factors that make embarrassing
professional sanctions even less likely, such as entrenched personal
and political allegiances to prosecutors. Furthermore, because bar
associations operate "under the rubric of the courts," some
commentators note a separation-of-powers concern with the judiciary
branch potentially trammeling upon the workings of the executive
branch. 1 6 "[P]rosecutors have directly [and successfully] raised the

exculpatory evidence is among the most commonly addressed and should be regarded as among
the most important categories of prosecutorial misconduct addressed by disciplinary
proceedings).
109. Rosen, supra note 93, at 733.
110. Id. at 733-34.
111. Id. at 735.
112. Id. at 733.
113. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 129.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Zacharias, supra note 105, at 761 (noting that "[t]o the extent discipline requires an
investigation of the workings of a prosecutor's office, disciplinary agencies may consider it
invasive of the authority of a coordinate branch of government").
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claim that the application of particular professional rules to them
117
violates the principle of separation of powers."
While the preceding concerns cast significant doubt on the
efficacy of professional disciplinary sanctions in curbing Brady
violations, this is not to say that such sanctions should be abandoned
altogether. Disciplinary rules still may be effective "not so much
because prosecutors are regularly disciplined, but because there often
are no legal means other than professional discipline by which to
enforce prosecutors' compliance with ethical obligations." 118 More
pressure must be brought to bear on bar associations to cease
tolerating misconduct. The efficacy of disciplinary rules will increase
in the future if and only if awareness of these kinds of violations is
heightened.
B. Judicial Solutions
Judicial solutions provide another method of combating
prosecutorial misconduct that, like disciplinary sanctions, is
theoretically strong. As discussed above, Rule 16 and its state analogs
permit courts (1) to order a party to permit the discovery or inspection;
to specify its time, place, and manner; and to prescribe other just
terms and conditions; (2) to grant a continuance; (3) to prohibit that
party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; or (4) to enter any
other order that is just under the circumstances. 119 For example, if a
trial court feels as though prosecutorial misconduct has prejudiced the
defense, it may order the suppression of certain evidence. However,
"[t]rial courts which [sic] suppress evidence acquired through
unethical conduct often face reversal at the appellate level due to the
harmless error analysis."' 20 Suppression is not particularly helpful in
the Brady context, as prosecutors are unlikely to seek to introduce
evidence favorable to the defendant anyway. Suppression often faces a
similar criticism to remedies for Brady violations because it fails to
personally affect or punish an individual prosecutor.121

117. Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 99, at 143-44 (noting that some prosecutors have even
won outright on their challenges to disciplinary sanctions by employing this argument).
118. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1584-85
(2003); see also Dennis, supra note 99, at 142 (acknowledging that, while the practical impact of
disciplinary sanctions is minimal because they are so infrequently used, many commentators
believe these rules to be the only effective method of discipline).
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(A)-(D).
120. Lyn M. Morton, Seeking The Elusive Remedy For Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression,Dismissal,or Disipline?,7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1102 (1994).
121. Id. at 1103.
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Other potential judicial remedies are: instructing the jury
simply to assume certain facts that the undisclosed information could
have proven, holding the nondisclosing party in contempt, declaring a
mistrial, or even dismissing the case. 122 Holding the offending party in
contempt is a promising remedy, but "reluctance to use contempt as a
mechanism to combat prosecutorial misconduct is somewhat curious,"
because courts could effectively tailor their contempt power to
sanction a prosecutor's specific conduct. 123 This tailoring ability is
helpful given the variance in contexts and levels of culpability in
which violations occur. For instance, in the federal system, section 401
of the United States Code provides that a court may punish offenders
by fine or imprisonment (or both) at its discretion. 124 Most federal
courts require a finding of wrongful intent in addition to the statutory
conditions to support a conviction for contempt, though some
jurisdictions apply a more lenient standard. 25 Further, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure enable a federal court to punish
''summarily a prosecutor whose conduct constitutes contempt when
the judge certifies that the contumacious conduct was committed in
the judge's presence."' 26 In theory, this allows courts to avoid "the full
panoply of procedural protections" that have to be given in other
27
contempt actions.
The strongest judicial remedy available for a Brady violation
may be appellate reversal of a defendant's conviction or sentence.
While reversal fails to punish an offending prosecutor directly, it
provides the strongest possible relief to a wronged defendant. It also

122. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.6(a) (3d ed. 2008); see also
Elizabeth Napier Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 1450
(2006) (advocating "instructing the jury on the duty to disclose and allowing the defendant to
argue that the failure to disclose raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt" as a
remedy for Brady violations).
123. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:Influencing ProsecutorialDiscretion and
Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 894 (1995).

124. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
125. E.g., In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564, (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("By definition, contempt is a
'wilful disregard or disobedience of a public authority.' The requisite intent may be inferred if a
lawyer's conduct discloses a reckless disregard for his professional duty." (quoting Sykes v.
United States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (1971))); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367 (7th Cir.
1972) ("[W]hile numerous courts, including this Court, have apparently required a specific
finding of wrongful intent . . . the Government has vigorously argued that the lesser
requirement enunciated in Offutt v. United States be applied." (citations omitted)).
126. Meares, supra note 123, at 895; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) ("[The court (other than
a magistrate judge) may summarily punish a person who commits criminal contempt in its
presence if the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and so certifies.").
127. Meares, supra note 123, at 895.
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reflects poorly on the prosecutor and forces her to re-prosecute or drop
the charges altogether.
In a study of capital cases from 1973 to 1985, one of the most
common reasons for reversal was prosecutorial suppression of
evidence. 128 Criminal defendants typically must demonstrate a
violation of constitutional due process on appeal, which in turn
requires a showing that, in light of all of the evidence in the case, the
presence or absence of the withheld evidence would affect the outcome
of the case. 129 Prosecutorial misconduct alone is not enough; a
likelihood of affecting the outcome must be demonstrated. Harmlesserror review does not apply because the defendant must meet the
threshold of materiality,' 30 and "materiality is not simply harmless
error by another name."1 3 1 Rather a prosecutor's actions, a priori,
necessarily are judged on how guilty a defendant appears, even after
the undisclosed evidence is included. Thus "the guiltier a defendant
seems before trial, the less disclosure he is legally owed," a fact that
32
should trouble many.
Courts also are forced to consider which individuals really
suffer when judicial remedies are employed. If a defendant is factually
guilty but his conviction is overturned because of a prosecutor's gaffe,
133
society at large, not merely the individual prosecutor, suffers.
128. Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor:Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors,61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45,
89-90 (2005) (extrapolating from a study done by Professor James Liebman at Columbia
University, which found a sixty-eight percent reversal rate for capital cases, among which the
two largest reasons for reversal were incompetent defense attorneys and suppression of evidence
by prosecutors and police. Sixteen percent of these reversals were attributable to suppression of
evidence); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: ErrorRates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846-50 (2000) (same); James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error
Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995 5 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Group, Paper No. 15, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=232712 (same).
129. Dunahoe, supra note 128, at 90.
130. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 669 (2004) ("Unless suppressed evidence is 'material
for Brady purposes, [its] suppression [does] not give rise to sufficient prejudice to overcome [a]
procedural default.' " (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999)); Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995) ("[T]he constitutional standard of materiality must impose a higher
burden on the defendant." (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).
131. Deal, supra note 43, at 1784 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. See Dennis, supra note 99, at 141:
[A]lthough courts may lament improper actions by prosecutors that fall short
of constitutional violations, their failure to punish prosecutorial misconduct
recalls, as one judge said, "the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the
oysters ...." [I1f courts accounted for the full range of prosecutorial
misconduct by suppressing evidence, dismissing charges, or overturning
convictions accordingly, society would suffer the consequences of a guilty
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Logically, judges will not pursue a policy that allows many guilty
individuals to go unpunished as it would eviscerate the societal benefit
of the criminal justice system, a system judges protect. If punishing
prosecutorial misconduct might allow guilty men to go unpunished,
courts will remain reluctant in their use of these remedies. 34 In the
tug of war between judicial propriety and the vindication of society's
wishes, the prosecutor essentially can escape the system unscathed.
C. Civil Liability
In addition to the difficulties arising from the Supreme Court's
materiality standard, the unavailability of civil liability as a remedy
after the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Imbler v. Pachtman is one
of the largest obstacles to effective disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. 135 Many commentators have extolled the potential benefits
of using civil liability to fight prosecutorial abuse. 136 The most
commonly employed means of finding a governmental employee
personally liable, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("section 1983") provides that
any person who, under color of law, subjects a citizen of the United
States to the deprivation of any constitutional rights shall be civilly
liable to the party injured. 137 Accordingly, section 1983 could be a
person going free while the prosecutor effectively would receive no "more
than a personal slap on the wrist."
(citations omitted). Arguably, on the other hand, society benefits from the employment of these
remedies because it adds a deterrent effect toward future prosecutorial misconduct, thereby
conferring a greater benefit overall.
134. See id. ("Neither judges nor the public are willing to accept such a high price to address
what both regard as collateral harm at best."). Of course, even if a violation is found and reversal
is granted, a defendant might be re-prosecuted and convicted anyway.
135. 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).
136. See DAVIS, supra note 17, at 130 ("[A]lthough [prosecutors] may not always
intentionally set out to engage in misconduct, it leads one to question whether the Supreme
Court has provided prosecutors with a comfort zone that fosters and perhaps even encourages a
culture of wrongdoing."). But see Meares, supra note 123, at 892-93:
It is not clear that civil damages would curb effectively the persistence of
prosecutorial misconduct, even if such damage actions were available. The
poor are disproportionately represented among criminal defendants, and
generally speaking, there is no right to appointed counsel in civil cases.
Unless these civil damage suits reap lucrative damage awards, it is unlikely
that many attorneys would accept them on a contingency fee basis.
(citations omitted).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
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powerful tool in combating transgressions by civil servants in
positions of authority.
In Imbler, the Court wrestled with the inherent tension in
deciding where to draw the line in immunizing prosecutors. On one
hand, absolute immunity may leave "the genuinely wronged defendant
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or
dishonest action deprives him of liberty."138 On the other hand,
offering prosecutors only qualified immunity may subject prosecutors
to time-consuming and costly defenses of frivolous claims, encouraging
prosecutors to be overly tentative in pursuing their cases during and
after trial. 139 Additionally, trying certain allegations under section
1983 "would require a virtual retrial of the criminal offense in a new
1 40
forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay jury."
The Court in Imbler concluded that the "trust of the prosecutor's office
would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for
damages," and it granted prosecutors absolute immunity for their acts
1 41
in initiating and pursuing the government's case.
According to the Imbler Court, civil liability as a remedy is
unnecessary because the two most effective means of combating
prosecutorial conduct remain available: disciplinary sanctions and
criminal prosecution. The availability of these checks "undermine[s]
the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to
insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of
persons accused of crime." 142 As previously discussed, disciplinary
sanctions are underused and ineffective. Criminal liability, however,
seems more promising, as the "Court has never suggested that the
policy considerations which [sic] compel civil immunity for certain
governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the
criminal law." 143 Thus, this Note argues that criminal sanctions, in

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
424 U.S. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 429.

143. Id.
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addition to a more extensive use of "open-file" policies, offer the best
prospects for curtailing Brady violations.
D. Internal Supervision
The best method of reducing prosecutorial misconduct like
Brady violations may be prevention, and one mechanism of prevention
is internal supervision. 144 Internal controls in the form of training,
guidelines, and manuals can be effective because "[p]rosecutors tend
to adhere to these regulations, not only because they provide needed
guidance in resolving ethical dilemmas, but because violations may
serve as a basis for internal discipline or poor performance
evaluations." 145 Such consequences may have a greater and more
immediate bearing on prosecutors than other remedies.
For instance, in response to the above-mentioned push to
amend Rule 16, the DOJ simultaneously reworked the parts of the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual dealing with the government's disclosure
obligations in order to support its contention that amending the Rules
is unnecessary. 146 The December 2006 version of the manual offers a
"department policy" that
goes beyond the
mandates of
constitutionality, acknowledging that "a fair trial will often include
examination of relevant exculpatory or impeachment information that
... may not, on its own, result in an acquittal." 147 The policy requires
"disclosure by prosecutors of information beyond that which is
"material" to guilt as articulated in Kyles v. Whitley and Strickler v.
Greene.'1 48 Whether the revised manual will reduce Brady violations
or provide prosecutors much guidance is unclear, and it would be
difficult to measure empirically. The Rules Committee, however,
regarded the revisions as a step in the right direction.149

144. Zacharias, supra note 105, at 762.
145. Id. at 762-63.
146. See HOOPER & THORPE, supranote 65, at 6:
DOJ has continually opposed any proposed amendment to Rule 16, believing
it to be unnecessary and expressing inter alia concern about pretrial
disclosure of the identity of prosecution witnesses. Notwithstanding that
position, DOJ has worked with the committee in drafting language for a
proposed amendment while simultaneously undertaking efforts to revise the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual (Manual) regarding the government's disclosure
obligations that might serve as an alternative to an amendment to Rule 16.
147. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 5.001(C) (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-roomlusamtitle9/5mcrm.htm.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. See HOOPER & THORPE, supra note 65, at 7 ("Committee minutes revealed that some
committee members believed the revised language to the Manual was a substantial
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IV. SOLUTION

The Supreme Court's complex standard of materiality coupled
with other obstacles hampers the effective use of traditional remedies
for disclosure violations on both the state and federal levels. This Note
suggests two additional methods of curtailing Brady violations. First,
state and federal prosecutors should move to a so-called "open-file"
policy of discovery in criminal proceedings. Second, criminal sanctions
like those available in U.S. Code chapter 18 section 242 should be
employed in cases of particularly egregious behavior.
A. Open-File Policies
Justice Marshall, in his Bagley dissent, advocated a more
inclusive standard of disclosure than the materiality standard because
"disclosure of all evidence that might reasonably be considered
favorable to the defendant would have the precautionary effect of
assuring that no information of potential consequence is mistakenly
overlooked." 150 As Justice Marshall noted, "[t]he prosecutor surely
greets the moment at which he must turn over Brady material with
little enthusiasm."'15 1 An open-file discovery policy would best
accommodate this inclusive rationale.
1. Policies and Practice
Perhaps the simplest way to combat the withholding of
exculpatory evidence before trial is to further liberalize discovery
rights. A number of state and federal prosecutors already employ socalled "open-file" policies, allowing defendants and their attorneys to
examine all evidence to be used against them before trial.152 The
benefits of such policies are apparent: the opportunity for a prosecutor
to keep a key piece of evidence from the opposition disappears if an
open-file policy is maintained properly. However, the potential for
prosecutors to act in bad faith is one of many potential criticisms of
open-file policies.

improvement, but in the end concluded that DOJ's internal policy could not serve as a substitute
for the proposed amendment to Rule 16.").
150. 473 U.S. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. For an in-depth look at discovery and open-file discovery in the Duke Lacrosse Case, for
instance, see Mosteller, supra note 15, at 257 (discussing the need for full prosecutorial
disclosure of all evidence).
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Such a solution has the potential to create a normative shift
before prosecutors even consider hiding evidence. If an individual
office establishes a longstanding and consistent practice of disclosing
all evidence to a defendant, the incidences of both bad-faith and
inadvertent disclosure violations likely would decrease. Moreover,
establishing this practice as a norm for an office ideally would foster a
sense of office-wide responsibility for meeting disclosure obligations,
thereby reducing the individual incentives to violate these obligations.
Additionally, this recommendation is premised on the fact that
most prosecutors do not intentionally act in bad faith but rather are
pressured into misconduct by superiors, the electorate, or the victims
and their families. A systematic and well-established policy of simply
putting all the cards on the table might actually be refreshing for
prosecutors, freeing them from the challenge of guessing the impact
that a piece of evidence might have at trial.
One benefit of open-file discovery is that the relative strength
or weakness of a case will be readily apparent, which in turn will lead
to more efficient plea bargaining. While some prosecutors may claim
that liberalizing discovery will impede their ability to "bluff' their way
into a more advantageous plea for the state, 153 plea deals based on
such deception are precisely the type of outcomes that due process
seeks to prevent. Moreover, it is unclear whether pursuing higher
sentences than would be attainable at trial through surreptitious plea
deals is desirable. 154 Greater disclosure also would alleviate some of
the internal institutional pressure which frequently forces prosecutors
to overcharge a defendant. 155 Closer calls will still go to trial and
depend on the parties' advocacy and a judge's or jury's fact finding. On
the other hand, defense attorneys and prosecutors will save resources
under an open-file policy, as defense attorneys can more persuasively

153. See Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581,
1584 (1981):
Confronted with a defendant who is uninformed about the evidence available
or likely to be available for trial, a prosecutor may bluff or mislead the

defendant about the strength of the government's case. The prosecutor may
thereby obtain a plea from, or a stiffer sentence for, the defendant than would
otherwise be possible.
154. See id. (same).
155. See id. at 1586 ("Although prosecutors have little excuse for filing inadequately
supported charges, they are under strong institutional pressures not to move for dismissal once
charges have been filed.").
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show their clients the strength of the prosecutor's case instead of
156
wasting resources on truly futile trials.
These policies can be judicially enforced and do not rely
completely on prosecutors because the government can be forced to
adhere to an open-file policy once it is employed. 157 Thus, a prosecutor
who violates an open-file policy may be subject to sanctions by the
trial court. 15 The discretion of a court to employ these sanctions
sounds in equity, as hiding pieces of evidence from a defendant under
an open-file policy clearly prejudices a defendant who relies to her
detriment on the policy.159
Prosecutors may worry that open-file policies will result in
over-exposure. Revealing too much during discovery could threaten
the safety of witnesses, compromise the integrity of an investigatory
process, or enable would-be perjurers to concoct alibis that match the
prosecution's evidence. 160 Open-file discovery also could seriously
undermine the adversarial role of the prosecutor. This problem can be
solved by creating exceptions to the policy with a minimal threshold
for showing cause before a court. That is, if a prosecutor decides to
redact information that might expose a witness to danger, the court

156. See Elizabeth Allen, Bexar DA's Open File Policy Called 'Inferior' By State's Defense
Lawyers, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS,
Sept. 30, 2007, at 9B, available at
http://www.mysanantonio.comlnews/metro/stories[MYSA093007.09B.Open.30fa422.html:
Defendants don't always want to believe a lawyer who tells them the state
has a rock-solid case, they said. So if a lawyer can show the defendant a copy
of the full police report, witness statements, and the sky-high lab results of
his blood alcohol test, he or she is more likely to be convinced that a trial is a
bad gamble. And that, they say, saves time and money for everyone. "I've had
clients tell me they don't believe what they've got in the file," (a defense
attorney] said. "The more information I have, the easier it is for me. I'm not
on a suicide mission here."
157. United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 1986) ("If the government agrees to
maintain an 'open file' policy, thereby disclosing its evidence and theories to the defendant,
however, the government is obligated to adhere to that agreement.").
158. Id.
159. See id.:
An open file agreement is essentially an informal discovery agreement; as
with other discovery orders, it is generally within the district court's
discretion to award sanctions when there has been a violation. Therefore,
even if the government violated its open file policy, it would still be within
the district court's discretion to determine what the appropriate sanction such as excluding the evidence or awarding a continuance or mistrial should be.
(internal citations omitted).
160. But see Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1622-24 (2005) (arguing that "the traditional
concerns of witness safety and investigative confidentiality do not justify narrow discovery
regimes in contemporary state practice").
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can demand a showing of cause but give a great deal of latitude in
doing so. Additionally, a file can display all of the prosecution's
evidence without divulging the prosecutor's work product.
Currently, discovery policies are broadening in a number of
ways, ranging from pretrial mandatory disclosure of lists of witnesses
and their prior statements to open-file policies. 161 For instance, two
U.S. attorneys in the Southern District of Texas praise the open-file
policy in their office for permitting "the defense to review materials
even beyond that required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16"
which "frequently impels defendants to opt for a guilty plea rather
than trial."162 While a number of state jurisdictions and even some
U.S. attorneys' offices currently use open-file policies or are debating
their implementation, this use still is not widespread enough to
maximize the benefits that open-file policies present or to guard
against the potential for differing outcomes based solely on the fact
that a defendant was arrested in one jurisdiction and not another. 163
In a comprehensive analysis of discovery in the Duke Lacrosse
case, Professor Robert Mosteller lauds the "critical impurtance of full
open-file discovery as an aid to justice."' 64 As Professor Mosteller
notes, political pressure after the infamous Gell death penalty
prosecution in North Carolina resulted in an expansion of criminal
discovery in the state. 165 Liberalized discovery, coupled with intense
media scrutiny, brought the calamity of the Duke Lacrosse

161. Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining:The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial
Adjudication in American CriminalProcedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 275 (2006).
162. Don DeGabrielle & Mitch Neurock, Federal Criminal Prosecutions: A View From the
Inside of the U.S. Attorney's Office, 43 HOUS. LAW. 32, 34 (2005).
163. For example, Texas has a fairly widespread use of open-file policies. Warren
Diepraam, ProsecutorialMisconduct: It Is Not the Prosecutor's Way, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 773,
780 (2006); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 75 n.194 (2005) ("For example, in response to a high
profile exoneration where exculpatory witnesses' statements were suppressed, North Carolina
Attorney General Roy Cooper has called for statewide adoption of open file policies."); Sarokin &
Zuckermann, supra note 74, at 1107 (noting that many federal prosecutors "choose to open their
files to opposing counsel" and that some are "[clognizant that the practice promotes greater
efficiency and is in many cases likely to convince the defendant to enter a guilty plea rather than
undergo the rigors of trial when the case against him is strong'); Andrea Weigl, Lawyers Debate
Openness, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 15, 2004, at BI (reporting that North
Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper has proposed that prosecutors open their files).
164. Mosteller, supranote 15, at 307.
165. See id. at 260 ("Gell's acquittal... produced the passage of a... full open-file discovery
law broadly applicable in the trial of all felony cases."); see also Anne Blythe & Joseph Neff,
Nifong, Bar Will Both Be Judged, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 12, 2007, at Al
(referring to "withering criticism [of the State Bar] for its tepid prosecution" of the Gell
prosecutors as contributing to the "pressure... to get it right this time," and stating that case
had prompted the rule change).
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prosecution to light, and "after full disclosure ...District Attorney
Nifong was, in short order, off the prosecution." 166 Indeed, the "largest
and most important message of [the Duke Lacrosse case and other
similar cases] is that full disclosure solves, or at least helps solve,
Brady issues," a message that neither prosecutors nor legislators
167
should take lightly.
2. Legislative Action
Implementing open-file policies on a statewide basis through
legislation would send a strong message and provide much-needed
consistency among jurisdictions. In its second edition, the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice ("the Standards") recommended what
essentially amounts to an open-file discovery policy, mandating
disclosure of "all the material and information within the prosecutor's
possession or control." 168 Only one state, North Carolina, adopted a
provision loosely based on the second edition's proposal. 169 In its third
edition, the Standards moved to a categorical classification of
disclosure, but sought to keep in line with the spirit of the "open-file
discovery adopted in the second edition of the Standards." 170 While the
ABA and other similar organizations have recognized the benefits of
open-file discovery, legislative movement towards such liberalized
discovery has not followed, and opposition to such legislation remains
strong.
In New York, for example, a state assemblyman has repeatedly
introduced a bill that would liberalize criminal discovery and has
encountered much opposition. 171 A number of district attorneys in the
state have criticized the bill, citing witness safety as the principal
reason for their objections. 172
Even though the bill reportedly
addresses this concern, allowing prosecutors to request protective
orders regulating discovery for "good cause," the bill continues to
"languish" in committee, and may never pass. 173 As this situation
illustrates, even in the face of what appears to be a well-reasoned

166. Id. at 307.
167. Id. at 308.
168. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11-2.1 (2d ed. 1980); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
76, § 20.1(c).
169. LAFAVE ETAL., supranote 76, § 20.1(c) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1)).
170. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11-2.1; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 76, § 20.1(c).
171. Leah Nelson, Concealed Witness, Part II, INST. FOR JUD. STUD., Nov. 21, 2007,
http://www.judicialreports.com/2007/11/concealed_witness-partjii.php.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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proposal that accommodates prosecutors' concerns about overliberalizing discovery, many prosecutors seemingly will always object
to a relinquishment of their control over evidence. Legislating openfile policies across the board, instead of relying on local jurisdictions to
do so individually, cuts down on the potential for discrepancies in
fundamental rights from district to district. Legislation is also
symbolic: it uses the full force of an elected legislature to emphasize
how important an entire state considers the discovery rights of
criminal defendants to be.
3. Potential Pitfalls
Open-file policies are by no means a cure-all for Brady
violations. The largest potential obstacle to an effective open-file
policy is that its success depends upon prosecutorial compliance. A
prosecutor's office can purport to maintain a transparent file system
174
while hiding exculpatory evidence that may never come to light.
Moreover, if prosecutors' mixed or plainly malevolent motives underlie
Brady violations, a system seemingly predicated on the good-faith
compliance of prosecutors may not aid the situation.
Two cases in particular demonstrate problems with open-file
policies. First, as one scholar notes, "Strickler v. Greene provides a
cautionary lesson on the dangers of reliance on a prosecutor's open-file
policy. ' 175 The prosecutor in Strickler employed an open-file policy but
failed to include impeachment information from a police report that
the defense could have used at trial. 176 The defense relied on the openfile policy and failed to discover this evidence. 177 Similarly, in Banks v.
Dretke, a defense attorney relied on a prosecutor's open-file
guarantees and failed to discover that a key witness was an informant
and had questionable motives underlying his testimony. 7 8 Unlike
174. J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60
ARK. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2007):

Reliance on an "open file" policy poses two potential problems for trial
counsel. First, while it may prove convenient for defense counsel and permit
pretrial investigation to proceed without conflict, it presupposes the good
faith of the prosecutor's office... Second, regardless of the prosecutor's good
faith in making disclosure through the "open file," the defendant's access to
exculpatory material may be frustrated by the failure of members of the
prosecution team-including investigators-to disclose evidence favorable to
the accused to the prosecutor for inclusion in the "open file."
175. Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in Aggravation,
17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 343 (2005) (discussing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1999)).
176. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 273-76.
177. Id. at 276.
178. 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004).
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Strickler, however, the defendant in Dretke successfully avoided
procedurally defaulting on his appellate claim, but the potential
danger of reliance on open-file policies remains just as clear. 179
As these cases demonstrate, vigilance is necessary in criminal
discovery even if an open-file policy is used in a given district.
Nonetheless, the potential drawbacks of an open-file policy do not
outweigh its benefits. Open files encourage a transparent process and
alleviate the burden of making close calls for prosecutors. However,
rogue prosecutors still may intentionally leave beneficial evidence out
of the open discovery files. A more severe remedy is needed, therefore,
for prosecutors who act in bad faith.
B. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal sanctions are often overlooked when it comes to
fighting prosecutorial misconduct, and perhaps for good reason. The
notion of prosecuting prosecutors for crimes stemming from their acts
in their official capacity should certainly give one pause but should not
remove the remedy from the arsenal altogether. An examination of
current scholarly material reveals a widespread belief that
prosecutorial misconduct continues to occur at an alarmingly high rate
and that remedies currently employed to combat such misconduct
have failed. Thus, it may not be a truism to declare that such an
extreme situation calls for an extreme remedy.
1. 18 U.S.C. Section 242
Regarded as the criminal analogue to 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
18 U.S.C. section 242 ("section 242") provides a means by which
agents of the government can be held criminally responsible for their
misdeeds under color of their official position. Section 242 provides
that any person who, under color of law, subjects a citizen of the
United States to the deprivation of any constitutional rights shall be
80
subject to fine, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.
Despite the Imbler Court's endorsement of section 242,181 scholars
have largely ignored or dismissed the possibility of using the statute
to combat Brady violations. 8 2 This neglect is partially attributable to

179. Id. at 704-05.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
181. 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976).
182. See Dunaho, supra note 128, at 83 (noting that this "sanction has received the least
attention by both courts and scholars"); see also Weeks, supra note 91, at 878-79 (noting the
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the historical rarity of using section 242 against prosecutors1 8 3 and the
obstacles presented by suggesting prosecution under section 242.
a. The Elements
To prove an offense under section 242: (1) the prosecutor's acts
must have deprived someone of a right secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the prosecutor's illegal
acts must have been committed under color of law; (3) the person
deprived of his rights must have been an inhabitant of a state,
territory, or district; and (4) the prosecutor must have acted
willfully.184

The most troublesome element is the fourth, which necessitates
a willful civil rights violation. 185 This burden is difficult to meet
because "the state must prove not only that the prosecutor violated
the defendant's rights, but that the prosecutor did so knowing that his
or her actions would deprive the defendant of these rights. 1 8 6
Prosecuting a Brady violation could be particularly difficult because
the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not
only that a prosecutor suppressed Brady material-evidence that
meets the Brady standard of materiality-but that the prosecutor
willfully suppressed the evidence to deprive the defendant of his
constitutional rights.
According to the Supreme Court, once a due process right has
been recognized and defined by court decisions, that right is
encompassed by section 242.187 Thus, "misuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of
state law within the meaning of section 242." 188 It is important to note
impediments to prosecution under section 242, chiefly the reluctance by other prosecutors to
pursue such an action).
183. See Weeks, supra note 91, at 878-79 (noting that "not one of the many specific judicial
findings of a deliberate refusal by a prosecutor to disclose Brady material that have been
summarized in this article has even resulted in a prosecution, far less a conviction, of the
prosecutor").

184. United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1968) (amended 1988, 1996)).
185. See Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932, 938 (10th Cir. 1951) ("[I]ntent and
willfulness are essential elements of the offense delineated in section 242." (citing Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
186. Dunaho, supranote 128, at 84.
187. United States v. Stokes, 506 F.2d 771, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Screws, 325 U.S. at
104).
188. United States v. McDermott, 918 F.2d 319, 325 (2nd Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951) (internal quotations omitted)).
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that proving the prosecutor possessed the specific intent to violate a
constitutional right is not essential to conviction; it is enough to prove
that the prosecutor's "aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a
citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution." 18 9
Under section 242, an act is willful if it is carried out "voluntarily and
intentionally and with specific intent to do something [the] law
forbids; that is, with intent to violate a specific protected right."190
Section 242 is fundamentally "designed to prevent violations of all
fourteenth amendment rights," but it must actually be implemented
against misbehaving prosecutors to secure any preventative benefit. 91
b. InitiatingProsecution
Because section 242 is a criminal statute, a prosecutor must
initiate a prosecution, 192 meaning that prosecutors must initiate these
actions against their own. Thus, if "[p]rosecutors simply will not
prosecute other prosecutors," any notion of employing section 242
more frequently may be futile. 93 Such a contention should not be
fatal, however, as any solution offered places faith in certain actors to
uphold and enforce the law. Further, with every disclosure violation
that becomes publicly scrutinized (such as the Duke case), pressure on
prosecutors to guard the integrity of their offices increases, and the
appeal of a remedy like section 242 becomes more apparent.

189. United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250, 1255 (2d Cir. 1976):
Proof of a specific intent on the part of the police officers to deprive persons of
federal rights, rather than to engage in conduct having the effect of such
deprivation, was unnecessary. The fact that they "may not have been
thinking in constitutional terms is not material where their aim was not to
enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was
protected by the Constitution."
(quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 104); United States v. O'Dell, 462 F.2d 224, 232 n.10 (6th Cir.
1972).
190. United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 885 (9th Cir. 1993).
191. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1980).
192. See Dixon v. State of Maryland, 261 F. Supp. 746, 749 (D. Md. 1966):
[Plaintiffs] intention ... to institute personally a criminal proceeding against
the State and the individual defendants ... cannot be done. Any such
complaint should have been sent to the United States Attorney, and in a
proper case the Court might refer the papers to him, but that would be futile
in this case.
In Dixon, a prisoner attempted to initiate a criminal proceeding against a number of state
officials, including the State's Attorney for Baltimore. Id. While more anecdotal than instructive,
the case at least informs us that criminal liability under section 242 is not an altogether new
idea.
193. Weeks, supra note 91, at 879.
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As the Imbler Court noted, one of the chief rationales
underlying prosecutors' immunity from civil liability is that anyone
can initiate a civil proceeding; thus, a large amount of frivolous and
burdensome litigation theoretically would weigh prosecutors' offices
down. Criminal prosecutions do not present the same problem because
the government alone can initiate a proceeding under section 242,
which is just one of its benefits as a remedy.
c. Section 242 and Materiality
In order to use section 242, the government must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt not only that a prosecutor suppressed Brady
material-evidence that meets the Brady line of cases' standard of
materiality-but also that such a suppression was made willingly.
However, "that [a prosecutor] may not have been thinking in
constitutional terms is not material." 194 It is enough to show that a
prosecutor acted "in reckless disregard of constitutional prohibitions
or guarantees." 195 Still, this burden is a substantial impediment to
Luckily, this burden is not
increasing the use of section 242.
insurmountable.
Because a paramount concern in the criminal prosecution of a
prosecutor is the possibility of punishing a prosecutor for a mere
"technical" blunder, a high standard requiring willfulness is actually
desirable to weed out accidental violations. This standard would
ensure that prosecutions under section 242 would be reserved only for
the most egregious breaches of prosecutorial duty, including willful
suppressions of Brady material. Additionally, requiring a showing of
the offending prosecutor's recklessness toward the deprivation of a
defendant's constitutional rights is hardly fatal. Prosecutors are well
aware of Brady and the constitutional liberties it protects.
Accordingly, a prosecutor cannot claim, post hoc, that he was unaware
that the defendant would be deprived of his due process rights by
knowingly suppressing favorable evidence warranting Brady
protection. In other words, proving an intentional suppression of
evidence necessarily means that a prosecutor intentionally deprived a
defendant of his constitutional rights.
One of the few cases on record in which a prosecutor was
prosecuted for a Brady violation occurred twenty-five years ago in
New York. In that case, Patrick J. Brophy was convicted in the
District Court for the Western District of New York of "willfully
194. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 91 (1945).
195. United States v. O'Dell, 462 F.2d 224, 232 n.10 (6th Cir. 1972).
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depriving an individual of rights secured to him by the United States
Constitution in violation of [section 242]. '"196 Brophy contended that
"his conviction resulted from an inadvertent violation of a prosecutor's
duty under the mandates of Brady v. Maryland not to withhold
evidence favorable to an accused." 197 Thus, even if a strong showing of
willfulness seems difficult, Brophy suggests that section 242 still may
be employed.
d. CriminalSanctions and ProfessionalDiscipline
A conviction under section 242 may, in some instances, lead to
professional disciplinary sanctions including censure, suspension, or
removal from office. 198 If professional discipline is a theoretically
effective means of combating prosecutorial misconduct but is
hampered by the lethargy or unwillingness of disciplinary boards,
section 242 can, in theory, act as a preliminary step. Once the factfinding process is complete, associations or courts need only evaluate
what professional punishment is warranted.
2. Federal Oversight of State Prosecutors
An additional benefit of section 242 is that it provides an
avenue to bring charges against a state official in federal court. 199 If
particularly egregious examples of Brady violations surface, the DOJ
can step in and pursue criminal actions against misbehaving, local
district attorneys. As the vast majority of criminal cases in this
country are handled at the state level, the locus of most prosecutorial
abuse is likewise at the state level. If political entrenchment,
cronyism, and a lack of political capital paralyze most localities from
policing their own prosecutors, then oversight by the federal
government may be warranted.
There are many well-reasoned challenges to this idea. First
and foremost, given the exigencies of the current political climate,
prosecuting state prosecutors is likely to take a backseat for the
foreseeable future on the DOJ's agenda. Moreover, persuading federal
authorities that there is a sufficient federal interest in bringing
charges against local prosecutors with an already thinly stretched

196. In re Brophy, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (setting aside Brophy's
automatic suspension under N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1983)).
197. Id. (internal citation omitted).
198. Id.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) ("Whoever, under color of any law .. ")(emphasis added).
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budget is unlikely. 200 Even if actions against misbehaving prosecutors
are not the focal point of the next administration's policy for the DOJ,
the beauty of a criminal action is in its in terrorem effect, offering a
20 1
great deal of potential deterrence "cheaply."
Few, if any, "defense attorneys have the time, resources, or
expertise to conduct massive investigations of prosecution officials" on
the state level, so many are left to wonder: who else can? Again, even
while acknowledging budgetary constraints, it would seem that
federal authorities are much more capable of shouldering this burden
than individual defense attorneys because of the infrastructure and
resources they already have in place to conduct such an investigation.
C. Tighter In-House Regulation and Media Transparency
Tighter in-house regulation coupled with closer media scrutiny
is the final (and least formal) tool advocated by this Note. Because the
best method for reducing prosecutorial misconduct is prevention,
methods of in-house regulation (such as those provided by the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual) are effective and provide a stable foundation of
20 2
conduct on which prosecutors can base their trial strategies.
Further, there is perhaps no greater leverage available than the
threat of a poor performance review or a pass-over for advancement
20 3
because of misconduct.
Further, if internal controls are insufficient to rein in
disclosure violations, the news media is always just around the corner.
In the Duke case, for instance, it was the media that initially
emboldened Mike Nifong and all but convicted the student defendants
before they set foot in the courtroom. 20 4 Once Nifong's misconduct
came to light, persistent media coverage spurred a quick response

200. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC),

UNDER COLOR OF LAW

(2004), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civright/107/ (noting that section 242 claims (against any
official, not just prosecutors) frequently top declination rates for federal offenses). For example,
during the first quarter of 2004, of 230 criminal proceeding against individuals in which 242 was
the principal charge, 227 of these resulted in the DOJ declining to file formal charges, although
the three which did proceed each resulted in conviction. Id. In sixty-nine percent of these,
prosecutors said they rejected these charges for one of four reasons: 'lack of evidence of criminal
intent, minimal federal interest, no federal offense evident, or weak or insufficient admissible
evidence." Id. (emphasis added).
201. By "in terrorem" I mean to deter or frighten into compliance beforehand.
202. Zacharias, supra note 105, at 762-63.
203. Id.
204. See Mosteller, supra note 15, at 303 (noting that Nifong gave fifty to seventy interviews
himself during the initial weeks of the case's investigation); Joseph Neff, Nifong Conduct
Rebuked Early, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 15, 2007, at Al.
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from the North Carolina Attorney General's Office. 20 5 The media also
provided an accessible avenue of vindication and redress for the
accused. Would the attorney general have moved so quickly if Nifong's
transgressions had not been plastered on the Raleigh News and
Observer's front page each morning?
Prosecutors' offices should use the power of the media to their
advantage. Publicity, even of the negative sort, can be used to foster a
sense of trust in prosecutors and to dissuade any misbehaving actors
within their own offices. Prosecutors are faced with a cruel dilemma
after an office discovers a disclosure violation: announce the violation
or keep quiet and hope the violation never becomes public, which may
carry a fate Nifong knows too well. While neither is ideal for most
offices, the former at least allows the office the first crack at how the
error is revealed to the public and offers the office a means to nurture
a sense of trust in the public by voluntarily owning up to its mistakes.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's promise of fair process in Brady remains
largely unfulfilled. While the vast majority of prosecutors at both the
state and federal levels perform their jobs in an ethical manner under
a great deal of pressure, the occasional prosecutor acting in bad faith
can affect a great deal of harm. For a variety of reasons, traditional
solutions such as professional disciplinary actions, judicial remedies,
and procedural rules simply are ineffective at curtailing disclosure
violations.
The inexpensive and relatively noninvasive practice of open-file
discovery policies can go a long way toward preventing these
violations. Indeed, imagine if Michael Nifong were so accustomed to
handing over DNA results as a matter of course that he knew he
would have to abandon the case the moment he received the test
results. What if Richard Convertino had been required to simply hand
over everything in his possession, preventing him from even
mistakenly withholding the photographs?
In addition, a harsh remedy like criminal prosecution under
section 242 is needed for those ill-willed prosecutors who intentionally
and maliciously withhold evidence, refusing to comply with any other
preventative measure. If imagining that Nifong would have
voluntarily handed over the DNA results even under a more liberal
open-file scheme is difficult, subjecting him to a criminal action seems
the most fitting recourse.
205. See, e.g., supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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No one "wins" when a prosecutor is prosecuted.
Rather,
success will be realized when those accused of crimes in this country
are assured that all evidence, whether incriminating or exonerating, is
heard by a jury of their peers without ever contemplating the need to
criminally prosecute those sworn to uphold our laws.
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